Today the Senate will try to add some changes to the “bailout” bill that the House rejected (and for good reason) on Monday. The objective is to try to dangle some legislative carrots to get just a dozen congress-critters to flip-flop. If I was a congress-critter (little chance of that ever happening, though) I would be pretty miffed at the low estimation of character and self-esteem afforded mere representatives by their obvious superiors in the Senate.
There is plenty of blame to go around, and it is easy for people that lean to one party to blame someone in the other, but the house rejection of the bailout bill has been caused by public outcry that crosses the political spectrum. Blues no like, Reds hate it, too. This is a panic that has been caused by the mismanagement of regulatory authority, and can be cured by the same means. The explanation for the cure comes later.
But first, the rant. In a few weeks, we have seen a huge concentration of power in the banking and finance industry. Several large private investment banks were forced to merge with large bank chains. Then two large banks were seized (absent a true failure) and forced to merge with the remaining big banks.
Now, we have three giganormous banks that control the bulk of the banking business, regular and investment banking. And our political leaders want the U.S. Treasury to pony up an obscene amount of money to make these three bigs banks sounder and more profitable. I am no youngster, but about a half-century ago (well within my lifetime) the entire U.S. economy was not a lot larger than this bailout request.
The real problem here has rightly been described as Toxic Paper. But recent changes in regulations are what made the difference between bad and toxic. We have read plenty about the mortgage crisis, and how many people have been conned and are losing their homes. It’s true. Foreclosures are higher than normal. And some of those people were the victims of overzealous lenders. But not all. Some of them are criminals. Overpriced homes are being passed back to the banks as borrowers walk away from their loan. Many of these people came to be in this situation because they lied on their mortgage applications. They lied about how much money they made, they lied about their intention to live in the home… what they intended was to bet the house value would rise, and they could sell it for a profit before making more than a few payments. Making intentional misrepresentations in order to secure a loan is not a new crime. While the banks share blame for not checking, absent the bad behavior the loan would not have been made, either.
So a pile of mortgage loans, including those created by crime, were all packaged together and passed off to investors, but much of which ended up a Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These two governmentally created monsters, both of which have been sent to the woodshed, issued preferred stock to obtain the funds needed to buy these packaged mortgages. Their stock was one of the few investments banks could make outside of Treasury notes for their prime capital. And these guys paid a better rate than the Federal government did. Guess who some of the biggest holders of this now worthless or near-worthless stock is? Maybe you should call your local bank and see if they own any… chances are they do.
Now you see why they want a bailout… the government has started an avalanche of bank failures, and they want to throw your (and my) money at the problem. But there is a way we should be able to cure the problem by removing the artificial, regulation caused excessive loss component. Here is how, and why.
The mortgage packages traditionally were valued as stable, low risk investments (maybe 1%). Many of these packages, however, have shown massive losses (5% and higher). A significant amount of the increase is not people that are losing their homes because of bad decisions, or adverse luck, but are people who don’t live in the home, and bought it solely for speculation, and as I mentioned too many lied to get the credit. The drop in housing prices has made profit impossible. But the worst of the losses can already be identified. The people whose mortgages are not delinquent and are not in foreclosure already are not going to let their homes go if they can do anything about it. The prospect of additional future losses is not an straing extrapolation from those suffered already.
However, regulations have magnified the problem. In particular, a reform instituted as a result of the Enron debacle, called mark-to-market has been artifically magnifying the effect. The principle behind mark-to-market is that if you can only sell an investment to another party at $X, then it should not be carried on the books at any higher valuation. In the abstract, that makes sense. But what is wrong is that it is too simplistic for these circumstances. These packages have an definitive current value, because they generate revenue every month from the good mortgages. But serious questions about how much future losses could happen (which we previously postulated are not likely to follow recent examples) have made few investors willing to buy them, except those that know a good deal when they see one, and are only willing to pay pennies on the dollar for them. You can’t really blame them, but their entrepreneurial spirit has formed a “market” price that has forced the banks to value all the rest of the packages at the same, low fire-sale prices. These prices are far below what common sense would say the remainder of the package is worth (which is less than the face value), because it views the losses as continuing at an artifically high rate. So the packages, at the moment, are poisoned.
The cure for the valuation problems will be experience, which will take time. In 30 years, we will be completely certain, because all the mortgages in any particular pool will either be paid off, recast into new, different loans, or foreclosed on. It will be history. Right now, it is 28 or 29 years shy of that point, and we don’t know. A few more years and the likelyhood that people will have paid 5 years and then quit is pretty low.
In the mean time, the mark-to-market regulation needs to be modified… not killed. Simply making the valuation the higher of the current, proven cash flow valuation or the market price will make a tremendous difference, because the market price is tainted by panic. If more mortgages in a package go bad, then the valuation will be lowered by that experience.
Mark to market was implemented to remove guesswork from asset evaluation, so as to make the kind of phony asset price manipulation that occurred in recent years impossible. But right now, it is substituting the guesswork of speculators for proven cash-flow model prices, and in doing so is robbing institutions of needed capital.